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Helder Ferreira de Mendonça
This paper builds on earlier studies of central bank independence
(CBI), making a comparison of the rankings of central banks for 15 countries
through three different indices. The analysis reveals that there is no shared
concept of CBI and that the indices are a measure of the inflation bias. The
Brazilian case is used as an example, with the objective of examining the
impact on inflation of an increase in independence over time, as measured
by Cukiermans index. The findings indicate that CBI is a consequence of
the conduct of monetary policy and that it is not an adequate framework
for developing credibility.
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I
Introduction
Nowadays, central bank independence (CBI) is
considered one of the main conditions for assuring low
and stable inflation. This view is largely a consequence
of the dissemination of the well-known empirical
evidence that there is a negative correlation between
inflation and CBI. Although the majority of empirical
studies support this conclusion, the reliability and
usefulness of CBI indices and the robustness of the
previous studies have been questioned, especially since
1995.1
In the same vein as the current literature on CBI,
this paper analyses two major points. First, it discusses
the quality of independence indices by comparing the
three most popular independence measures in the
literature, constructed by Alesina and Summers (1993),
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992), and Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Forder’s suggestion
(Forder, 1999) that one can hardly view the advocates
of different concepts as supporting the same legislative
policy proposals would confirm that there is no shared
concept of what constitutes statutory independence.2
Second, this paper points to a potential problem of
endogeneity in the CBI indices. Both CBI and inflation
may be related to a third factor, such as a society’s
aversion to inflation. Without controlling for the third
factor, the relationship between CBI and inflation may
be spurious (Posen, 1993). The present paper reiterates
this criticism, arguing that CBI indices measure the
degree of inflation bias in the economy and are
therefore, by definition, negatively correlated with
inflation. Further, it is observed that if CBI includes the
issue of whether or not price stability is the main
objective of the central bank, this may, in principle,
lead to reverse causality, especially if the analysis is
put in a time series perspective.
The analysis of a particular country is important
for the literature concerning CBI because the majority
of the empirical literature is a result of cross-sectional
comparisons of economic outcomes. Thus, there is a
difficulty in evaluating the effects of institutional
changes within a given country (Hutchison and Walsh,
1998). One way to determine whether the effort and
the success of an economy in the quest for price stability
is related to an increased degree of CBI is the selection
of a country that has had success in reducing inflation.
In this sense, a study of countries such as Australia,
Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the
United Kingdom could be profitable. It takes less
effort, however, to stabilize inflation in these
economies than in developing countries. Furthermore,
the literature concerning CBI indicates that in industrial
countries, independence is systematically and
inversely correlated to inflation. Thus, it is very
probable that the selection of one of these
industrialized countries will indicate a relationship
between price stability and an increase in the degree
of independence. In order to attempt to eliminate the
possible tendency of bias in the analysis, the selection
of a developing country is recommended. With this
objective, Brazil was chosen for a case study.
In summary, this paper builds on earlier analyses
of CBI, making a comparison of the rankings of central
banks for 15 countries through three different indices.
This study reveals that there is no shared concept of
CBI, and that the indices are a measure of the inflation
bias. Furthermore, with the objective of verifying the
impact on inflation of an increase in independence over
time, measured by Cukierman’s index, the Brazilian
case is used as an example.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II
assesses previous empirical results reported in the
literature. The third section analyses the quality of
independence indices by comparing three measures.
Section IV discusses the endogeneity of the CBI indices.
Section V analyses the impact of CBI, the turnover of
central bank governors and the interest rate on inflation
in the Brazilian case. The final section offers some
concluding comments.
1 Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2001) list 35 papers (after 1995) that
record a change in the empirical evidence on the consequences of CBI.
2 The analysis, relative to the first point in this paper, is an upgrade
in relation to the intuitive analysis offered by Forder (1999).
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II
The origin of CBI measures: a brief review
The empirical analysis that supports the thesis of CBI is
based on a negative correlation among several proxies
for independent central banks and inflation.3  Several
studies show a strong correlation between a higher
degree of legal independence and a lower inflation rate
for industrialized countries.
The main relationships found in the literature
between CBI and the performance of the economy can
be summarized in the following ways: (i) in industrial
economies, legal independence and inflation have a
strong negative correlation; (ii) in developing countries,
there is no evident relationship between legal central
bank independence and inflation; (iii) there is a positive
correlation between political vulnerability of the central
bank and the rate (or variation) of inflation; (iv)
countries where the monetary authorities have
announced their goals have been presenting lower
inflation rates; (v) the legal CBI does not have a
correlation with the real growth average;4  and (vi)
central banks with a higher degree of autonomy do not
finance deficits.5
One of the main problems in the analysis of the
CBI proposal refers to the difficulty in evaluating the
possible effects on the economy of an increased
independence. In the search for a solution to this
problem, two types of independence indices are used
in the analysis: (i) legal independence indices, which
denote the relationship between monetary policy and
the laws that establish and define the power of the
central banks; and (ii) the independence indices
achieved by questionnaires (real independence indices)
that are based on judgements concerning the behaviour
of the central bank.
The literature on independence recognizes that
legal independence is a basic prerequisite to isolating
the central bank from the influence of the political
authorities. Thus, at first, the existence of legal
independence is necessary in order to create an
appropriate institutional environment capable of
creating conditions so that a higher independence is
attained by real independence indices.
The empirical analysis concerning the
independence proposition was put in the spotlight
between the second half of the 1980s and the beginning
of the 1990s. The first authors who developed an index
based on legal attributes for central banks were Bade
and Parkin (1985) and Alesina (1989). These indices
mainly take into account: (i) which authority controls
the monetary policy; (ii) the presence or absence of
government employees on the board of the central bank;
and (iii) whether the government appoints the majority
of the board members of the central bank.
In the 1990s, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(1991) elaborated a two-part index that was applied to
the majority of the industrialized countries. The first
part dealt with the independence of bank policies
(existence of a procedure for appointing the board of
the bank, and also the duration of their mandate and
the presence of guidelines that incorporate the goal of
monetary stability. The second referred to economic
independence (existence of a maximum level,
established by law, that the central bank may lend to
the government, and whether the central bank is
responsible for the supervision of the bank system).6
Following the same model developed by their
predecessors, Eijffinger and Schalling (1993) built an
index that encompasses: “(i) formal responsibility of
CBs with regard to monetary policy; (ii) the relationship
between the CB and government/parliament in the
formulation of monetary policy; (iii) the procedures for
the appointment of the board of a central bank”
(Eijffinger and van Keulen, 1995, p. 51) The main
difference in comparison to the previous cases is the
3 Several papers discuss this result, see Cukierman (1992);
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992); Alesina and Summers
(1993); Eijffinger and Schalling (1993); Posen (1993); Eijffinger
and van Keulen (1995).
4 Although the empirical evidence in the literature does not support
the idea that CBI improves economic growth, there are two points
that do not eliminate this possibility: (i) the behaviour of an CBI is
more predictable because it is less vulnerable to political pressure,
and thus it helps to improve economic stability and the planning
capacity of private agents; and (ii) an CBI decreases the costs for
society because it reduces inflation volatility and therefore
uncertainty about inflationary behaviour.
5 This point is associated with the observation that an CBI does not
use the inflation tax, and thus it is independent from the fiscal
authority.
6 CB supervision of the bank system is associated with the effort to
guarantee price stability.
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extent of the central bank’s responsibility for monetary
policy. In this last index, enhanced importance is
attached to the laws that give the central bank exclusive
control over monetary policy.
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) elaborated
one of the best-known methodologies for the
measurement of CBI.7  This index was built on 16 basic
legal features of central banks, divided into the
following four groups (Cukierman, 1996): (i) the
appointment, dismissal, and legal duration of the
mandate of the main executive (usually the president);
(ii) the institutional location of the final responsibility
for monetary policy and the procedures for the
resolution of conflicts between the government and the
central bank; (iii) the importance of the stability of
prices in comparison to other objectives (such as high
levels of employment or financial stability); and (iv)
the constraints on the government with regard to taking
loans from the central bank (market or subsidized rate)
or on the central bank with regard to lending to a third
party.
After the above-mentioned studies, several papers
were developed with the objective of disaggregating
indicators into their various components, in order to
determine which aspects of independence affect the
inflation performance.8
III
Is there any convergence among CBI indices?
One relevant point is to verify that the independence
indices treat the same object in the CBI empirical
literature, since the indices were created for the
measurement of independence. If the concept of
independence differs from index to index, this means
that there is no homogeneous concept of independence.
Under the hypothesis that the indices are based on
different concepts of independence, the analysis of the
linkages between the degree of independence and
several elements in the economy (interest rate, output,
inflation, etc.) may reveal different effects on the same
object and may therefore lead to inconclusive results
for the empirical analysis. This observation is
mentioned as one of the main weaknesses of the
empirical analysis concerning independence.
Forder (1999, pp. 35-36) notes the following: “The
failure to agree on a measure of independence makes
impossible any test of the effects of independence. It is
important to recognize exactly what the point is. It is
not the foolish one that different authors use different
approaches to measure independence and so cannot
be said to be talking about the same thing. The problem
is not the different approaches to measurement, but
rather the different resultant measures. (...)The claim
of these studies [measurement of independence] is that
they show a general tendency for lower inflation to be
associated with greater independence. And indeed this
claim could even be correct, but what the literature has
not succeeded in doing is offering an empirical concept
of independence that allows the claim to be tested.”
In order to determine whether the indices reveal a
homogeneous concept of independence, a correlation
analysis with different independence measurements was
made. For this purpose, three indices that are frequently
used in the empirical studies of CBI (Alesina-Summers
(AS), Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti (CWN) and Grilli-
Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT)) were chosen. The study
focused on 15 industrialized countries and was divided
into two parts.9  The first analysed the independence
indices, while the second analysed the independence
ranking of the countries according to these indices. This
division matters because the divergence between the
three resulting rankings reveals inconsistencies in the
measurement of independence (table 1, columns B).
Table 1 lists each country’s values for CBI and its
ranking for each above-mentioned index. Furthermore,
sample summary statistics for each of the three scales
7 That research resulted in an index of legal independence for all
the industrialized countries and for 50 developing countries (period
1950-1989).
8 See, Fuhrer (1997); Forder (1999); de Haan and Kooi (2000);
Brumm (2000); Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2001) and Farvaque
(2002). For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to use the
“new indices” of CBI.
9 The justification for the use of industrialized countries in the
analysis is that there is no evidence that central bank independence
is associated with low inflation in emerging economies. Evidence
that supports this affirmation is present in Cukierman, Webb and
Neyapti (1992).
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are listed. This analytical framework is justified by the
fact that an analysis based only on the first part does
not allow for a qualitative assessment. An indication
that this perspective deserves attention is the finding
presented in table 2 that the CBI rankings obtained by
each methodology differ considerably among
themselves. This observation is valid especially for the
countries where the measure of independence is not
high.
The data presented in table 1 allowed for the
elaboration of figures 1, 2 and 3. The first section of
each graph exhibits the relationship between indices,
while the second section shows the relationship between
rankings from indices (denoted by “R”). In other words,
figure 1 presents the relationship between the AS and
CWN indices, and between the ASR and CWNR rankings;
figure 2 shows the relationship between the AS and GMT
indicators and between the ASR and GMTR rankings; and
figure 3 presents the relationship between the CWN and
GMT indices and between the CWNR and GMTR rankings.
The use of the ranking of the countries is justified by
the fact that the correlation tests among the
independence indices are not capable of capturing the
essence of the analysis proposed. The correlation tests
among indices only relate the values of the coefficients,
without qualifying the relations among the points.
Based on the finding that there is almost a total
coincidence between the first and second places
resulting from each index for countries with higher
independence, and the observation made by Forder
(1999, p. 33) that “[c]learly, the apparent similarity of
measures of independence depends on agreement that
the central banks of Germany and Switzerland are
highly independent”, the analysis of each relationship
follows three steps. The first column of graphs uses all
countries in the sample; the second column excludes
Germany and Switzerland (case denoted by “A” –countries
that were classified as having a higher independence)
from the sample; and the third column excludes also
the United States of America (case denoted by “B”
–occupying the second place in the ranking– see
table 1).10
TABLE 1
Industrialized countries (15 countries): indices and rankings of CBI
Alesina and Summers Cukierman, Webb Grilli, Masciandaro and
(AS) and Neyapti (CWN) Tabellini (GMT)
Countries Index (A) Ranking (B) Index (A) Ranking (B) Index (A) Ranking (B)
Germany 4 1 0.69 1 13 1
Australia 2 4 0.36 6 9 4
Belgium 2 4 0.17 13 7 6
Canada 2.5 3 0.45 5 11 3
Denmark 2.5 3 0.5 3 8 5
Spain 1.5 6 0.23 11 5 8
France 2 4 0.24 10 7 6
Italy 1.75 5 0.25 9 5 8
Japan 2.5 3 0.18 12 6 7
Norway 2 4 0.17 13 - -
New Zealand 1 7 0.24 10 3 9
United Kingdom 2 4 0.27 8 6 7
Sweden 2 4 0.29 7 - -
United States 3.5 2 0.48 4 12 2
Switzerland 4 1 0.64 2 12 2
Mean 2.35 - 0.34 - 8 -
Std. Dev. 0.84 - 0.16 - 3.04 -
Minimum 1 - 0.17 - 3 -
Maximum 4 - 0.69 - 13 -
Source: Author’s estimates, on the basis of Alesina and Summers (1993); Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992); and Grilli, Masciandaro
and Tabellini (1991).
10 The United States Federal Reserve System, the Deutsche
Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank are excluded from the
sample because they are usually highlighted in the literature as an
independence paradigm.
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The graphs in figures 1, 2 and 3 show that the
correlation among rankings is lower than the correlation
among indices. Moreover, the exclusion of Germany,
Switzerland, and the United States from the sample
contributes to the reduction of the correlation between
measures of independence. Thus, there is an indication
that the divergence of rankings and the exclusion of
the aforementioned three countries from the sample can
weaken the relationship among independence
measurements. Nonetheless, the figures generally
illustrate the existence of a significant and positive
correlation among the three indices (excluding the
relationship between AS-CWN and ASR-CWNR).
To ascertain if the results of the correlations are
consistent, the following equation was regressed (OLS
method) to analyse the relationship among the
independence indices:







 is a constant and CBI index* denotes a different
independence index than that used on the left side of
the equation.
Following the same framework as that used in the
correlation analysis, table 2 summarizes the regression
results. Table 2 is divided into six boxes. The first box
shows the estimates for the relationship between CWN
and AS indices (first row), CWN(A) and AS(A) (excluding
Germany and Switzerland - second row), and CWN(B)
and AS(B) (excluding Germany, Switzerland, and the
United States - third row). The second box shows the
2. Relationship between ASR-CWNR
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of table 1.
a See explanation of abbreviations in table 1 and in the two paragraphs preceding figure 1.
FIGURE 1
Relationship between AS-CWN and between ASR-CWNRa
1. Relationship between AS-CWN
AS-CWN
Correl.: r = 0.8400
No.obs. 15
AS(A)-CWN(A)
Correl.: r = 0.6059
No.obs. 13
AS(B)-CWN(B)
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No.obs. 15
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Correl: r = 0.4599
No.obs. 13
ASR(B)-CWNR(B)
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estimates for the relationship between the rankings from
CWN and AS (respectively CWNR and ASR) and follows
the same framework as in the first box. The idea of the
first box is repeated in the third to sixth boxes.
On the basis of these estimates, the idea is to verify
if the constant (α
0
) is significant and thus denotes a
strong disagreement between indices; or if, on the
contrary, the relationship between each pair of indices
is strong (captured by parameter α
1
 in equation 1),
confirming the homogeneity of the indices. The first
row in the first, third and fifth boxes (table 2) indicates
that the t-values of the indices are significantly different
from zero at a 99% confidence level and the average
R2 (adjusted) is 0.736. Therefore, these results (strong
statistical association among indices) confirm the
expectation, in theory, that the indices reflect a
homogeneous concept of independence. The same idea
can be applied for the first row in the second, fourth
and sixth boxes (analysis of rankings), although the
average R2 is less than in the previous case (0.616).
Despite these results, when Germany and
Switzerland are removed from the sample, the situation
changes considerably. The empirical results presented
in table 2 for the relationship among indices (second
row of first, third and fifth boxes) and for the
relationship among rankings from indices (second row
of second, fourth and sixth boxes) reveal that the t-
statistic values remain significant. Except for CWN(A)-
FIGURE 2
Relationship between AS-GMT and between ASR-GTMRa
1. Relationship between AS-GMT
AS–GMT
Correl.: r = 0.9079
No.obs. 15
AS(A)–GMT(A)
Correl.: r = 0.8547
No.obs. 13
AS(B)–GMT(B)
Correl.: r = 0.7626
No.obs. 12
2. Relationship between ASR-GMTR
ASR–GMTR
Correl.: r = 0.8898
No.obs. 15
ASR(A)–GMTR(A)
Correl.: r = 0.8159
No.obs. 13
ASR(B)–GMTR(B)
Correl.: r = 0.7522
No.obs. 12
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of table 1.
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AS(A) and CWNR(A)-ASR(A), all values are significant at
the 1% level, although R2 decreases substantially. For
the first case (analysis of indices), the average R2
corresponds to 0.512, while for the second case
(analysis of rankings), the average R2 is 0.404. These
results suggest that the exclusion of the above-
mentioned countries from the sample weakens the
statistic association among independence indices.
The exclusion of the United States together with
Germany and Switzerland from the sample confirms
the tendency noted above. The third row in each box in
table 2 reveals that the significance of the t-values of
the indices reduces the confidence level (except for
GMT(B)-AS(B) and GMTR(B)-ASR(B)) and the t-values of the
constant become significant in half of the cases. The
most relevant result is the analysis of the R2, whose
average value for indices is 0.336, and for ranking
0.282. Therefore, the result shows that the analysis,
when focused on all countries in the sample, is
misleading. When Germany, Switzerland and the United
States (countries that represent the example of
independence) are omitted from the analysis, the result
appears to negate the existence of a relationship among
the measurements of independence.
FIGURE 3
Relationship between CWN-GMT and between CWNR-GMTRa
1. Relationship between CWN-GMT
CWN(B)–GMT(B)
Correl.: r = 0.6685
No.obs. 12
2. Relationship between CWNR-GMTR
CWN–GMT
Corr.: r = 0.8612
No.obs. 15
CWN(A)–GMT(A)
Correl.: r = 0.7566
No.obs. 13
CWNR-GMTR
Correl.: r = 0.8254
No.obs. 15
CWNR(A)-GMTR(A)





Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of table 1.
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TABLE 2
OLS estimates of CBI indices and ranking
Dependent variable: CWN
Constant t-stat. AS t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
-0.042 -0.575 0.164 5.582a 0.683 15
Dependent variable: CWN(A)
Constant t-stat. AS(A) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
0.045 0.440 0.119 2.526b 0.310 13
Dependent variable: CWN(B)
Constant t-stat. AS(B) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
0.070 0.493 0.106 1.502c 0.102 12
Dependent variable: CWNR
Constant t-stat. ASR t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
1.511 0.765 1.661 3.359 a 0.423 15
Dependent variable: CWNR(A)
Constant t-stat. ASR(A) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
3.772 1.298 1.169 1.718 c 0.140 13
Dependent variable: CWNR(B)
Constant t-stat. ASR(B) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
5.190 1.498c 0.877 1.116 0.022 12
Dependent variable: GMT
Constant t-stat. AS t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
0.512 0.461 3.115 7.181c 0.808 15
Dependent variable: GMT(A)
Constant t-stat. AS(A) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
-0.305 -0.193 3.542 4.939 a 0.701 13
Dependent variable: GMT(B)
Constant t-stat. AS(B) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
-0.432 -0.197 3.611 3.335 a 0.529 12
Dependent variable: GMTR
Constant t-stat. ASR t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
0.438 0.535 1.326 6.466 a 0.773 15
Dependent variable: GMTR(A)
Constant t-stat. ASR(A) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
0.804 0.632 1.248 4.233 a 0.629 13
Dependent variable: GMTR(B)
Constant t-stat. ASR(B) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
1.733 1.175 1.062 3.229 a 0.512 12
Dependent variable: GMT
Constant t-stat. CWN t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
2.345 2.115b 15.642 5.620 a 0.718 15
Dependent variable: GMT(A)
Constant t-stat. CWN(A) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
2.027 1.278 16.826 3.471 a 0.525 13
Dependent variable: GMT(B)
Constant t-stat. CWN(B) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
2.775 1.688c 13.582 2.543 b 0.378 12
Dependent variable: GMTR
Constant t-stat. CWNR t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
1.306 1.426 0.543 4.850 a 0.652 15
Dependent variable: GMTR(A)
Constant t-stat. CWNR(A) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
2.054 1.486 0.466 2.988 a 0.442 13
Dependent variable: GMTR(B)
Constant t-stat. CWNR(B) t-stat. Adjus. R2 No. obs.
3.098 2.060b 0.368 2.255 b 0.312 12
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of estimates made from data contained in table 1.
a  Significant at the 1 percent level. b  Significant at the 5 percent level. c Significant at the 10 percent level.
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IV
The “endogenous character” of the indices
Since measures of CBI pay special attention to the
inflationary bias, these indices are indissolubly linked
to inflation. In other words, if a central bank is strongly
(or weakly) contrary to the inflationary bias, it is seen
to have a high (or low) independence, and thus a
negative correlation between CBI and inflation is found.
To put it another way, “... measures of independence
are only acceptable if one already agrees with the
theoretical principles on which the thesis of correlation
between independence and price stability is based. Of
course, if one defends the assignment of highest priority
to price stability as a measure of independence and then
correlates this measure of independence with price
stability, one should not be surprised to find some
correlation” (Carvalho, 1995/96, p. 169-170).
Therefore, with the objective of showing the
inherent tendency of a high negative correlation between
central bank independence and inflation in
questionnaires devised to measure the degree of CBI,
table 3 lists the most frequently asked questions. The
main objective is to identify, in each question, some
common characteristics that could reveal a prior
intention to confirm the negative correlation.
The questions in table 3 can be divided into three
groups: (i) questions 1, 2, 3 (present in all the indices
under consideration) and 7 have the objective of
identifying the possible influence of government over
operational decisions of the central bank; (ii) questions
4 and 5 try to reveal the capacity of the central bank to
neutralize the pressures from the government; and (iii)
question 6 verifies if the central bank is committed to
the quest for price stability or is concerned with other
objectives (for example, employment level).
Despite the above-mentioned differences, the main
point is the existence of one feature that is common to
all the questions: they were created with the objective
of evaluating the possible inflationary bias associated
with the conduct of monetary policy. Herein lies the
main element for an external critique. Since the
questions were created to evaluate the effect of the
largest degree of independence on inflation, there is an
implicit bias present. Consequently, the degree of
independence obtained by these indices has a tendency
to reveal a negative correlation between higher
independence and inflation.
The corollary of the above observation is that these
indices are not useful as an instrument capable of
demonstrating the effects of an increase in
independence on inflation. Since a low degree of
independence denotes, to a great extent, the presence
of an inflationary bias in the conduct of monetary
policy, and since the evaluation of this bias depends on
the observation of the inflation, the measure of
independence is ultimately a consequence of the
observed inflation. Furthermore, an internal critique can
be made on the basis of the observation that an increase
in independence today does not mean an immediate
fall in the inflation rate, because the central bank’s
credibility in reducing the inflation is not automatic. In
other words, the degree of independence in one period
TABLE 3
Most frequently asked questions for the measurement of CBI
BP A GMT ES CWN
1. Does the central bank have the final responsibility for monetary policy? X X X X X
2. Are there any government appointed representatives on the board of the central bank? X X X X X
3. Are any appointments to the board outside government control? X X X X X
4. Is there a limit on government loans from the central bank? X X X
5. Are there legal provisions that strengthen the bank’s position in cases of conflict X X
with the government?
6. What is the importance of price stability in relation to other objectives? X X
7. What is the duration of the legal mandate of the president of the central bank? X X
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of: BP = Bade and Parkin (1985); A = Alesina (1989); GMT = Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991).
ES = Eijffinger and Schalling (1993); CWN = Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
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cannot be held responsible for the average inflation in
that period.
An endogenous feature is therefore observed in the
indices. When the economy presents a low inflation
level, there is a tendency for indices to reveal a high
level of independence, while if the inflation rate is high,
the same indices exhibit a low degree of independence.
Hence, it is the level of inflation of an economy that
determines the degree of independence and not the
opposite. Based on an econometric analysis, Posen
(1993) offered evidence that supports this result. He
verified that in countries where the public interest has
anti-inflation motivations, institutions are being built
to sustain this aversion. On the other hand, in countries
where there is an acceptance of inflation, such
institutions are not developed. Besides, Posen showed
the existence of a clear causal relationship between anti-
inflationary interests and independence, and did not find
a relationship between high independence and a low
inflation rate.
V
Turnover rate, CBI index, inflation
and interest rate in Brazil
In order to illustrate the analysis made in the previous
section, a study of the Brazilian economy was carried
out. Brazil was selected because of its success in
attaining price stability since the middle of the 1990s.
Between 1986 and 1993, Brazil adopted several
economic plans in an attempt to stabilize inflation
(Cruzado, Bresser, Verão, Collor I and Collor II), all of
which failed. Success in the control of inflation came
only after the introduction of the Real Plan, a
stabilization programme divided into three steps: (i)
budgetary equilibrium; (ii) introduction of a new stable
unit of account to align the most important relative
prices in the economy; and (iii) the conversion of this
unit (URV – unit of real value) to the new currency of
this country (the real) with the parity semi-fixed with
the dollar. With the introduction of the Real Plan, the
new monetary unit (the real) was guaranteed to have a
level of international reserves equal to the volume in
circulation. In addition, currency issues were limited
by law, in accordance with the government’s intention
to indicate to the agents that such issues were not
necessary.
With the recovery of political stability after the
impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello,
an economic stabilization programme, adopted in the
second half of 1993 under the direction of the then
Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was introduced.
During that period a national consensus was built
around the idea that budgetary equilibrium was a
prerequisite to economic stabilization. In addition, the
exchange market was liberalized and the external debt
with the Paris Club was renegotiated. The main idea
was to gain the public’s confidence in the stabilization
programme in order to increase its chances of success.
Under the presidency of Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, the third phase of the Real Plan was concluded
in July 1994. The result was a substantial decrease in
inflation. In spite of the success in the control of
inflation, the cost of a tight monetary policy was not
negligible. In an attempt to control the pressure on
consumption due to the fall in inflation tax, the Central
Bank of Brazil (CBB) adopted a high interest rate
strategy. As a result, after the positive initial impact of
this fall in inflation on the real sector, three basic
problems appeared in mid-1995: (i) fiscal – the high
interest rate increased the debt/GDP ratio; (ii) economic
growth and unemployment –the high interest rate
strategy attracted speculative capital and reduced the
interest in productive activities, and thus increased the
unemployment rate; and (iii) external account– high
interest rates contributed to an appreciation in the
exchange rate and led to a persistent deficit in current
transactions.
The above-mentioned strategy remained in place
until June 1999. At that time, owing to a change in the
exchange rate, the National Monetary Council decided
on inflation targeting as the new monetary policy for
Brazil. Before this, two different targeting frameworks
had been used during the Real Plan: exchange rates
and monetary aggregates. The main motivation for
introducing inflation targeting was the expectation that
the use of this strategy could eliminate the inflation
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that resulted from supply shocks. It was expected that
the use of this monetary regime would neutralize the
pressure on prices stemming from the sharp currency
devaluation in January 1999, and would restore inflation
control.
In an attempt to demonstrate the endogenous
character of the independence index in relation to the
conduct of monetary policy, and thus the spurious effect
of CBI on inflation, Cukierman’s methodology (1992)
was used. In this framework, it was expected that CBI
would help to reduce/stabilize inflation. The
justification was that in Brazil, since 1994, the main
objective of monetary policy has been price stability,
and therefore the degree of CBI must have increased
considerably after that year.
It must be remembered that the analysis of the
independence of the monetary authority cannot be seen
only from the legal side. Based on the above-mentioned
methodology, an estimate was made of the degree of
independence of the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) for
the period 1980-2002 (table 4). As expected, the
outcome shows that 1994 was the year that presented
the highest increase in CBB independence (about 48%)
between 1980 and 2002. Therefore, it can be affirmed
that the increase in CBB independence was accentuated
after the introduction of the Real Plan.
The main arguments for the increase in CBB
independence after the introduction of the Real Plan
can be divided into five points:
(i) Use of a crawling peg for the exchange rate, a
strategy that was considered the main instrument for
maintaining price stability after the introduction of the
Real Plan. This framework was seen as useful in
impeding the acceleration of inflation by constraining
the prices of tradable domestic goods; attenuating the
inertial inflation that fed wages and prices of non-
tradable goods; and contributing to the convergence of
inflationary expectations, based on the inflation of the
anchor country. In addition, this mechanism created an
automatic adjustment of the money supply, reducing
the problem of dynamic inconsistency in monetary
policy.
(ii) Reduction of seignorage, an important indicator
of the level of independence because it reveals the
financing of the budget deficit through the money issued
(denotes the presence of fiscal dominance).11  Thus, a
higher seignorage would be associated with a lower
degree of independence; while lower seignorage would
mean constraints in financing the government, and thus
would indicate higher independence. Seignorage
reached its highest level in 1990 (5% of GDP) and after
1995 the level remained under 0.01%.
(iii) Use of intermediate policy targets, that is,
quarterly quantitative targets for a monetary base. In
accordance with Act No. 9,069 of June 1995, the targets
for monetary growth ceased to be determined by law,
and CBB became responsible for these targets.12  As can
be observed in table 5, there was a growth in the
fulfilment of the CBB monetary targets (from the last
quarter of 1995 the outcomes are found within the
expected range). As the rule followed by CBB was not
violated, the inflationary bias was reduced, giving more
credibility to the institution as a guarantor of monetary
discipline and thereby impeding an increase in inflation.
Despite this observation, CBB recognized that monetary
policy execution required strict compliance with
monetary programming in order to guarantee that the
fundamental goals of the Real Plan, namely economic
growth with declining inflation, would be attained.
(iv) Use of inflation targeting, which increases the
level of transparency and puts limits on inflation, and
thus binds the inflation variability. The consequence
of this framework is the reduction of inflationary bias,
and thus an increase in CBI. With the flexible exchange
rate introduced in January of 1999, the adoption of
inflation targeting in June of the same year represented
an arrangement that assured the influence of the central
bank on the control of inflation.
11 According to Fry (1998), the size of the deficit and the way in
which it is financed determine the level of independence of central
banks in the developing countries.
12 Empirical evidence suggests that over periods of five or more
years the growth in money is a major determinant of inflation (see,
for example Leeper and Roush, 2003).
TABLE 4
Estimates of CBB independence
Period 1980/85 1986/89 1990/93 1994/96 1997/99 2000/02
Degree of independencea 0.25 0.35 0.46 0.68 0.71 0.76
Source: Estimates on the basis of the methodology of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
a Degree of independence ranges from 0 to 1.
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(v) Reduction in the turnover of CB governors
(table 6). Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992)
highlighted that in developing countries the frequency
of turnover of the chief executive officer of the CB is a
good proxy for CBI because it is strongly and positively
associated with inflation. The idea behind this indicator
is that a more rapid turnover presumably creates more
dependence on the part of the CB, probably as a result
of political pressures.
Table 6 shows the turnover of CBB governors for
the period between March 1979 and December 2002.
It can be seen that the turnover has been decreasing
since 1985. The lowest turnover ratio was during the
tenure of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, when
there was a decrease of 56% compared with the previous
period.
1. Empirical Results
After identifying the main reasons for the increase in
the degree of independence of CBB after the introduction
of the Real Plan, it is important to analyse whether the
increase in independence was responsible for the
control of inflation. With this objective, a vector
autoregression analysis (VAR) was applied, using the
following annual data for the period 1980-2002: the
transformed inflation rate (INFD is the inflation variable
transformed in order to reduce heteroskedasticity of the
error);13  the turnover of the CBB governors (TOR); the
CBB independence (CBBI);14  and the modified Selic
interest rate (INTD).15  The last variable was included in
the VAR because it is now widely accepted that the
Brazilian monetary policy operates through setting a
TABLE 5
Brazil: Monetary program - 1995/1999
(R$ billion)
Quarter Restricted base M1 Expanded base M4
Estimated Confirmed Estimated Confirmed Estimated Confirmed Estimated Confirmed
1st/95 17.7 - 18.1 15.7 20.4 - 21.4 18.1 81.0 - 90.0 80.3 176.0 - 188.0 188.2
2nd/95 14.9 - 17.4 14.7 17.7 - 20.7 17.7 84.1 - 85.5 83.8 200.4 - 203.6 199.7
3rd/95 15.1 - 18.3 15.0 18.2 - 21.8 19.2 87.9 - 94.0 106.6 207.5 - 222.1 229.9
4th/95 18.6 - 23.1 20.7 22.4 - 27.8 26.6 111.0 - 122.7 122.3 233.4 - 258.6 251.2
1st/96 17.0 - 19.9 18.0 21.2 - 24.8 23.4 122.0 - 143.2 137.7 234.8 - 275.7 265.3
2nd/96 16.8 - 19.7 17.4 19.7 - 26.6 24.0 134.4 - 157.8 157.4 252.3 - 296.1 280.2
3rd/96 16.6 - 19.5 17.2 23.2 - 27.2 24.3 154.2 - 181.1 165.1 276.1 - 324.1 297.6
4th/96 20.6 - 24.2 20.1 28.6 - 33.6 29.0 159.4 - 187.1 184.1 289.0 - 339.2 322.1
1st/97 23.3 - 27.3 24.7 33.2 - 39.0 36.9 191.5 - 224.8 193.7 323.9 - 380.2 336.4
2nd/97 24.0 - 28.1 24.7 35.1 - 41.2 36.8 220.3 - 258.7 203.2 337.5 - 396.2 351.3
3rd/97 22.7 - 26.7 26.2 33.8 - 39.7 38.8 225.8 - 265.1 224.0 340.4 - 399.6 373.8
4th/97 31.7 - 37.2 32.3 48.6 - 57.1 45.6 257.7 - 302.5 280.1 371.4 - 436.0 392.8
1st/98 25.1 - 29.4 30.9 36.1 - 42.4 41.5 313.9 - 368.5 310.7 406.6 - 477.3 416.9
2nd/98 30.2 - 35.5 33.1 37.9 - 44.5 42.4 320.4 - 376.1 340.0 405.8 - 476.3 431.1
3rd/98 31.0 - 36.4 34.6 39.4 - 46.3 43.4 346.6 - 406.9 322.2 415.8 - 488.1 423.5
4th/98 34.6 - 40.7 39.9 45.0 - 52.8 49.0 347.7 - 408.2 352.3 435.1 - 510.7 453.4
1st/99 35.4 - 41.6 37.6 46.0 - 54.0 46.6 353.0 - 414.4 388.0 436.7 - 512.6 477.4
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
TABLE 6
Brazil: turnover of central bank governors
Presidents of Brazil Period Turnover
 ratioa
João Batista Figueiredo 15/03/1979 - 15/03/1985 0.67
José Sarney 15/03/1985 - 15/03/1990 1.20
Fernando Collor 15/03/1990 - 29/12/1992 1.07
Itamar Franco 29/12/1992 - 01/01/1995 1.00
Fernando Henrique Cardoso 01/01/1995 - 01/01/1999 0.75
Fernando Henrique Cardoso 01/01/1999 - 01/12/2002 0.33
Source: Estimates ono the basis of the methodology of Cukierman,
Webb and Neyapti (1992).
a Turnover ratio is the frequency of turnover of the chief executive
officer of the CB during the President’s tenure.
13 Inflation is measured by the extended national consumer price index
(IPCA); it covers a sample of families with personal income between 1
and 40 minimum wages and has a broad geographical basis. INFD is
the year’s inflation rate divided by one plus the inflation rate.
14 CBI index is the actual degree of independence weighted, based
on Cukierman’s methodology (1992).
15 Interest rate for overnight interbank loans collateralized by government
bonds registered with and traded on the Special System of Clearance
and Custody (Selic). INTD is the Selic divided by one plus the Selic.
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key interest rate. The VAR is used because the theoretical
analyses concerning CBI are not developed enough (in
particular for developing countries) to provide a
dynamic specification that identifies all relationships
among the variables in analysis.
It is first necessary to verify if the above-mentioned
series have a unit root. The unit root tests (Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perrron (PP)) denote
the acceptance of the null hypothesis (nonstationary
series) for the original values of these series. On the
other hand, for the case of first difference, the null
hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level, and
thus the series are stationary (table 7).
Before applying the cointegration test to the series
in analysis, the lag orders were determined by means
of Akaike (AIC), Schwarz (SIC) and Hannan-Quinn
information criteria (HQ). Owing to the presence of an
outlier in the inflation rate which occurred after the
introduction of the Real Plan, it was decided to place a
dummy variable to capture the outlier effect. It is
important to emphasize that the critical values of the
cointegration tests are no longer completely valid when
the model has deterministic variables other than the
intercept and trend. It is observed that both models (with
or without constant) and the outcome of the criteria
used denote 1 lag for the VAR (table 8).
The cointegration test proposed by Johansen (1991,
LR test statistic), based on the significance of the
estimated eigenvalues, indicates that the trace statistic
rejects the no-cointegration hypothesis at the 1%
significance level (table 9), but not the hypothesis that
there is more than one cointegration relation.16
The cointegration test indicates, therefore, that
there is a long-run equilibrium among variables
considered in VAR. The cointegrating vectors (β),
normalized for the variable INFD, as well as the
adjustment coefficients (α) are reproduced in table 10.
All components of the cointegrating vector are
significant at the 1% level, except for TOR, which is
significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, all variables
presented the expected indication: increases in the CBI
and interest rate lead to a reduction in inflation, while
an increase in turnover of CB governors exerts the
opposite effect.
TABLE 7
Brazil: Unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perrron (PP))a
Series Lag ADF test Lag PP test
CBBI 0 -2.9531 8 -2.8512
∆CBBI 0 -5.3460b 9 -6.0578 b
INFD 0 -2.9753 1 -2.9422
∆INFD 0 -6.6553 b 1 -6.6935 b
INTD 0 -2.0287 4 -2.0168
∆INTD 0 -3.5621 b 4 -3.5010 b
TOR 0 -0.6510 1 -0.6571
∆TOR 0 -3.9390 b 0 -3.9390 b
Source: Prepared by the author.
a ADF test: number of lags based on Schwarz criterion; PP test: lag based on Newey-West criterion using Bartlett kernel. For CBBI, INFD and INTD
constant and linear trends were applied. For ∆CBBI constant was applied. For other series, no-constant specification or time trend was used.
b Denotes rejection of the null of a unit root at the 1% significance level.
16 The specification selected has only the intercept within the
cointegration vector.
TABLE 8
Brazil: VAR lag order selection criteria
Lag With constant Without constant
AIC SIC HQ AIC SIC HQ
0 -10.35247 -10.10378 -10.29850
1 -15.76519a -14.27302a -15.44135a -14.85520a -13.61172a -14.58533a
2 -15.59074 -12.85509 -14.99703 -14.38647 -11.89952 -13.84674
Source: Author’s estimates on the basis of Akaike (AIC), Schwarz (SIC) and Hannan-Quinn information criteria (HQ).
a Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Table 11 shows the χ2 (Wald) statistics for the joint
significance of each of the other lagged endogenous
variables in equation INFD in the VAR model. The weak
exogeneity test performed for the variables denotes that
the variables under consideration can be treated as
exogenous. Thus, it is correct to estimate a model for
INFD. It is worth stressing that the values of the
coefficients of the cointegrating vector should not be
interpreted directly as a measure of the impact of the
innovations of each variable isolated from the rest
because these coefficients do not take into account the
relationships between the variables expressed in the VAR
model (Lütkepohl, 1991).
Figure 4 shows the impacts on the INFD due to the
increase in the standard deviation in the innovations of
the other variables.
The variables were ordered in different ways for the
analysis of the impulse response function, but the results
did not change significantly. It is shown that a positive
shock in the CBBI and in the interest rate reduces inflation
permanently. On the other hand, a positive shock in the
turnover of CBB governors contributes to an increase in
the inflation rate. In other words, the results suggest that
a mix of an increase in CBI and in the interest rate with a
decrease in turnover of CB governors should be a good
framework for reducing inflation.
The results above need to be clarified. Albeit the
empirical data denote that an increase in CBBI and TOR
contributes to reducing inflation, in fact both variables
depend on the macroeconomic environment. As pointed
out in section IV, Cukierman’s index is a consequence
of the success of monetary policy in the control of
TABLE 9
Brazil: Johansen’s cointegration test
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace 5% 1%
statistic critical value critical value
R = 0a 0.867686 78.41756 68.52 76.07
R ≤ 1 0.568159 33.92080 47.21 54.46
R ≤ 2 0.352939 15.44743 29.68 35.65
Source: Estimates calculated by the author using the Johansen cointegration test.
a Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level. Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% level.
TABLE 11
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inflation. In this sense, the results found from a CBI index
with an economy whose main monetary policy objective
is the quest for price stability are not surprising.
One important lesson extracted from the analysis
in this section is that it does not matter which country
(developing or industrialized) is considered in CBI
studies. The endogenous character of the indices
reflects a conservative monetary policy (aversion to
inflation) and, as a consequence, results in an
increase in CBI. Therefore, if a country changes the
conduct of its monetary policy against inflation, the
effect is an increase in CBI, thereby offering fallacious




The empirical evidence suggests that when countries
that have been historically successful in fighting
inflation are eliminated from the sample, it becomes
difficult to define a reasonable independence ranking
for central banks. Thus, an analysis that considers a set
of countries, but omits Germany, Switzerland and the
United States, may produce results that are quite the
opposite of those which CBI enthusiasts might hope for.
Further, the disagreement among the rankings by
indices reveals the subjective nature of the measurement
of independence.
The empirical results for the Brazilian economy
are in accordance with the standard literature
concerning CBI. The main point behind these outcomes
is the credibility of the conduct of monetary policy.
Blinder (2000) showed that, in the opinion of central
bankers and economists, CBI is the most important
criterion for establishing or maintaining credibility,
provided there is a history of honesty. In fact, CBI is
now understood as an operational independence, that
is, entailing the freedom of the CB in the conduct of
monetary policy in the quest for price stability. In spite
of the importance of Blinder’s observation, it needs to
be treated with caution because it is based on simple
opinions.
Brazil does not have a legally independent CB. Its
success in controlling inflation is due to the fact that
the CBB follows a set of criteria that represent a rule of
thumb for monetary policy (such as using interest rates
as a tool, increasing transparency and focusing
monetary policy on inflation). After the implementation
of the Real Plan, the priority of monetary policy was
the control of inflation. Due to this objective, CBB
adopted a conservative monetary policy and used two
different monetary regimes (crawling peg for the
exchange rate in the period between July 1994 and
January 1999, and, since June 1999, inflation targeting).
It is worth stressing that the CBBI is based on judgments
concerning the behaviour of the CBB. Consequently, this
indicator depends on the strategy adopted for the
conduct of monetary policy.
A low and stable inflation depends on credibility,
which is, in turn, endogenous to the public’s perception
concerning the accountability and the potential success
of the CB in the conduct of monetary policy. Developing
countries like Brazil that need to develop credibility
must look for other frameworks, instead of accepting
the presupposition that there is a vicious circle which
includes inflation and a lack of CBI. The main point is
that it is necessary to use a monetary strategy to achieve
a historical success against inflation, and thereby
develop credibility. Furthermore, since the main
objective of governments is to maximize social welfare,
and since the impact of monetary policy on the economy
is not negligible, it becomes necessary for the monetary
strategy adopted to take into account as well the possible
effects of a tight monetary policy on fiscal equilibrium,
economic growth and unemployment.
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